Traditional probabilistic risk assessment approaches often require failure scenarios to be explicitly defined through event sequences that are then quantified as part of the integrated analysis. This approach becomes difficult when failure propagation paths change as a function of the system state and Mission Elapsed Time (MET). Additionally, if the propagation paths represent interactions among even a modest number of components, the number of possible scenarios becomes combinatorially intractable. This paper presents an alternate approach for quantifying failure propagation probabilities in such a case. Rather than explicitly defining scenario sequences, simple physical models are created for each of the components. In this way, only the physical states and rules of component interactions must be defined, rather than event sequences for each individual scenario. Initiating failures are introduced into the system (either randomly or as defined by relative likelihood) and the failures cascade through the system via the interaction rules. This process is repeated using Monte Carlo methods, allowing the most probable scenarios to "self-evolve" in terms of both sequence path and frequency.
I TRODUCTIO
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) strives to achieve and maintain high safety standards for its space launch and exploration systems. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is incorporated into the development and operation of these complex systems to identify risk-driving factors and strategies for cost-effectively improving safety and performance. Crew safety remains NASA's primary goal for human spaceflight missions, and effective abort capabilities are crucial for reducing the overall risk to the crew.
The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center develops and applies simulation-based risk assessment approaches for analyzing crew launch vehicle abort scenarios during the ascent phase of the mission. The ERA approaches use physics-based models to characterize failure environments in terms of risks posed by blast overpressure, resulting debris field, and fireball thermal radiation [1] . The subsequent propagation of these failure environments is analyzed to evaluate the abort system's ability to escape safely. Failure propagation analysis involves assessing various failure "initiators" and quantifying their relationship with crew-threatening failure environments. The ultimate goal is to identify driving risk factors and guide designers towards effective risk-reducing strategies [2] .
Current PRA approaches can pose challenges, however, since they require failure scenarios to be explicitly defined through event sequences that are then quantified and integrated into the overall analysis. A list of failure initiators is generated to identify all critical functions required for a successful vehicle ascent, and each initiator can propagate its failure in multiple ways. Therefore, all possible propagation paths from every possible initiator need to be considered for a comprehensive analysis of all involved risks. This approach becomes difficult when these propagation paths change as a function of the system state and MET, or when the scenario count becomes unmanageable.
This paper presents an alternate approach for quantifying failure propagation probabilities to generate scenarios more organically and intuitively. Rather than explicitly defining scenario sequences, simple physical models of the components are created to generate self-evolving scenarios from a given failure initiator. Each component is described by its ability to generate physical threats to its peers as well as its susceptibility to state disturbances caused by other components. Each component monitors the integrated system state for changes that impact its own operation. In this way, only the rules of component interactions must be defined, rather than event sequences for each individual scenario. These interaction rules can vary as a function of the system state itself to more accurately represent the failure evolution. Initiating failures are injected into the system, either as prescribed or as defined by relative likelihood, and the failures cascade through the system via the interaction rules. This process is repeated using Monte Carlo [3] methods, since the significant uncertainties in the inputs make it infeasible to compute an exact result with a deterministic algorithm. As a result, the most probable scenarios "self-evolve" in terms of both sequence path and frequency.
This paper outlines how the approach can be used to simulate failure propagation from blast wave and debris field environments, and applies the approach to failures occurring in the engine compartment of a space launch vehicle. In this example, four liquid rocket engines are modeled and tested with various high-energy component initiators that are capable of creating explosive failure environments. Failures in highpressure turbomachinery during vehicle ascent are a serious threat and have been observed in the Space Shuttle Main Engine [4] . Propagation of these failures to nearby engines can lead to additional engine failures, causing loss of vehicle control [5] and/or inadequate thrust levels to complete the mission. Failure propagation to nearby high-pressure helium tanks is even more dangerous and can lead to high-energy explosions that threaten crew safety. A better understanding of the propagation path sequences will enable designers to determine optimal warning device locations to provide increased abort warning times.
This paper first describes the framework around which the model is built. Then, the physics of each propagation model is explained along with the specific pre-defined states and interaction rules required to run the simulation. Next, the model results are described. Finally, the paper concludes with the liquid rocket engine bay scenario. Observations from this test case are used to assess and cross-validate existing data to better understand the interrelationships between components and their surrounding environment, with the ultimate goal of improving the safety of crew launch systems.
MODELI G APPROACH
The Monte Carlo framework begins with explicit definitions of each component's physical states and interaction rules. A component is defined as a specific piece of a model (such as an engine fuel pipe or a high-pressure tank) that has inherently different characteristics, such as internal pressure or number of releasable fragments, from other modeled pieces. Each component is physically modeled using computer-aided design (CAD) software, and the geometry is included in the simulation using a triangulated surface mesh. The initial conditions assigned to a component-such as the number, speeds, and directions of fragments released in the event of failure-are characterized by uncertainty distributions so that every failure scenario is effectively unique. Physical properties assigned to each component, such as their internal pressure, help characterize the component's state. Each component also has vulnerability criteria that describe its own response to blast pressures and debris impacts.
This section outlines the debris and blast wave propagation models. It describes the initial states and conditions defined for each model as well as the physical mechanisms involved during the propagation.
Debris Propagation
The debris field environment is strongly dependent on the initial fragment distribution, which is defined in terms of the total number of debris pieces as well as each piece's mass and imparted relative velocity [1] . Masses are assigned by specifying a component's total mass and a distribution type to allocate a mass value for each debris piece. Velocities are assigned by specifying values and distribution types for the speed and distribution angles of each debris piece. A kinetic energy vulnerability criterion is included to describe a component's structural threshold for withstanding an impact.
To initiate the propagation sequence, the user selects the component that serves as the source of the propagation (i.e., the component that fragments and generates a debris cloud). The initiator's debris catalog, which defines the debris masses and velocities, is randomly generated based on the aforementioned inputs. These debris pieces are treated as point-masses that emanate from the source's geometric center.
The model calculates a debris strike by determining whether the velocity ray of each debris piece intersects a surface mesh triangle of any surrounding component. However, before determining whether the velocity ray intersects the individual triangles of a component's surface mesh, a triangulated "bounding box" is created to first compute whether the ray passes through the vicinity of any given component. This box uses the component's minimum and maximum coordinate values to determine the minimum enclosing box that contains all of the component's vertices. Each surface of the box is divided into two triangles for a total of 12 triangles (the minimum amount of triangles required for the box's triangulated mesh). This enables the model to save a significant amount of computation time since a component can have hundreds to thousands of triangles comprising its mesh. Figure 1 shows a visual representation of a meshed object surrounded by a meshed bounding box.
Figure 1 -Triangulated Sphere with Meshed Box
The inclusion of a point on the ray with a triangular plane can be determined by computing the parametric coordinates of the intersection point in the plane [6, 7] . If the ray intersects the plane, then the point of intersection can be evaluated to
determine whether that point also intersects the triangle. Otherwise, if the ray does not intersect the plane, then no intersections with the triangle are possible. Figure 2 illustrates the intersection of the ray with the triangle.
Figure 2 -Intersection of Ray with Triangle
Once the intersection with the plane is established, inclusion of that point within the triangle must be validated. This can be done by first computing the triangle's area in 3D space and then computing the triangular areas formed by the intersection point with each of the triangle's edges. If the difference between the triangular area and the sum of the other areas is zero (or less than a very small tolerance), then the areas are equivalent and the ray intersects the triangle. Otherwise, the ray only intersects the plane, not the triangle.
If the model results indicate an intersection of the velocity ray with any of the bounding box's triangles, then every triangle of the component's meshed surface is searched to determine whether the velocity ray intersects the component. If the model confirms an intersection with any of the component's surface triangles, it calculates the strike time using the debris piece's travelled distance and speed. Since the ray would intersect the component twice (to get both inside and back outside), only the first strike is stored and tabulated.
The debris piece imparts a kinetic energy to the component it strikes. A kinetic energy threshold is specified as an input for each component to establish the maximum energy impact it can withstand before failing. If the imparted energy exceeds this threshold, and if the component is breakable (i.e., it can generate debris), then the component serves as the new "source" of debris for propagation. That component's debris catalog is then generated and the model computes whether the new debris pieces intersect any other components. Those that have already generated debris for propagation (i.e., exploded) become nonexistent and are reduced to a single point so that they cannot be struck by subsequent propagations. The process repeats itself until no remaining components are struck or all further propagation possibilities are exhausted.
Blast Wave Propagation
Blast overpressure is the pressure caused by a shock wave due to a high-energy explosion or tank burst. The intensity of the overpressure environment is typically measured in terms of the peak overpressure value and the time integration of the overpressure distribution (i.e., impulse) [2] .
propagation characteristics, based on 1 kg of TNT at sea level. It generates blast environment parameters from component vessel parameters, ambient environment parameters, and distance from the vessel to a target component. The model outputs include incident and reflected peak overpressure as well as incident and reflected impulse.
The component vessel state parameters include the volume, pressure, and specific heat ratio of the contained gas. Ambient environment parameters, such as pressure, specific heat ratio, and speed of sound, also govern the shock propagation. These are determined from a given altitude, which the user specifies as part of the failure initiation. After subsequent propagations, however, the altitude changes based on the elapsed time along the launch vehicle's trajectory. The new altitude can be determined from an altitude-time history curve, which is typically obtained from a trajectory analysis of the given launch vehicle platform.
Similar to the kinetic energy threshold, an overpressure threshold is predefined for each component to establish the maximum peak reflected overpressure it can withstand before failing and becoming a new source of both debris and blast overpressure. The reflected peak overpressure is used because it is the maximum amount of overpressure experienced by the impacted component. Any element that has failed, either by debris strike or blast overpressure, becomes nonexistent for subsequent propagations.
Model Results
Using the modeling approach described above, the user needs only to specify the failure initiator to begin the propagation simulation, which continues until the system has catastrophically failed or the failure propagation ends. In this way, the chain-reaction scenarios manifest themselves, or "self-evolve," based on the initiator alone. It is clear to see that increasing the number of modeled components increases the number of possible permutations (and other sequence paths) resulting from a single initiator. Eventually, with a large enough number of components, the number of possible scenarios becomes combinatorially intractable. This approach allows for a large increase in modeled components for only a modest increase in computation time because the most probable scenarios naturally evolve.
The end result of the Monte Carlo simulation for a given initiator is the frequency of component failures of interest and the associated sequence of events. The model records the probabilities of each component's observed failure occurrences as well as the probability breakdown of each victim component's failure from all contributing culprit components. The model also tracks every failure sequence to determine the probability of any particular sequence and identify the most likely sequence of events. This enables the user to estimate the scenario likelihoods, which can be used to make informative risk assessment decisions.
The failure propagation approach is applied to an assembly of liquid-fuelled cryogenic rocket engines in the engine bay of a generic space launch vehicle. The components are created using CAD software [9] and are roughly based on a highly simplified version of Aerojet Rocketdyne's J2X, a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engine originally planned for use on NASA's Ares I launch vehicle [10] . The engine's critical high-energy components include the main combustion chamber (MCC), hydrogen fuel turbopump (FTP), oxygen turbopump (OTP), and gas generator (GG).
The end results of interest include the failure propagation paths that lead to either a loss-of-mission (LOM) or loss-ofcrew (LOC) outcome. Since a launch vehicle design may allow for one engine out (i.e., one engine can "fail" or shut down), a second engine out would compromise the mission and prompt an abort, causing a LOM. A second engine out would occur if the propagation path from a failure initiator eventually reached a critical component of another engine and caused it to fail. A high-pressure helium tank burst could cause a catastrophic failure to the vehicle stage. The severity of such a failure is dependent on many factors but, for this analysis, high-pressure tank burst is assumed to lead to LOC.
The 3D engine CAD geometry is imported into a finiteelement analysis tool that generates a surface mesh for the object with defined vertices, faces, and surface normals. This information is then imported into the failure propagation model. Figure 3 shows the simplified mesh model consisting of the MCC, turbomachinery (FTP and OTP), pipes (fuel, oxidizer, and hot gas), and nozzle.
Figure 3 -Simplified Engine Mesh Model
The engine bay assembly consists of four engines and four high-pressure helium tanks. Figure 4 shows a representation of the generic launch vehicle engine bay configuration. The engines are positioned in a circular arrangement and the helium tanks are positioned between two adjacent engines at a distance above them. Each engine is rotated 90 degrees with respect to adjacent engines for rotational symmetry. The engines were sized to fit the engine bay, each with a length of about 1.44 meters and maximum diameter of about 1.3 meters. Each tank has a length of about 0.76 meters and maximum diameter of about 0.42 meters.
There 
Test Case Inputs
Tables 1a and 1b summarize the debris and blast propagation model inputs, respectively. These values are only rough estimates, chosen to be representative of components from existing-class engines and helium tanks.
Table 1 -Input Parameters for (a) Debris Field (Top) and (b) Blast Wave (Bottom)
The MCC and tanks are given a range for the number of debris pieces generated for each Monte Carlo trial, a velocity magnitude of 300 m/s for each debris piece, and uniform distributions for each angle of spread. The turbopumps, however, do not come fully apart and are therefore assigned a fixed number of blades (as debris pieces) that propagate at a much higher speed of 1,000 m/s. Their distribution is circumferentially uniform with respect to the spin axis and normal around the spin axis normal. The rest of the components (pipes and nozzle) are treated as static elements that are allowed to be struck but do not generate any debris fields themselves. The pipes can fail in the sense that a leakage can occur if struck with enough energy or pressure, but the nozzle is assumed to not fail since only its non-critical portion is modeled. All defined values are conservative and every debris strike is treated as a failure to consider worst-case scenarios (i.e., the energy criteria is not employed). Figure 5 illustrates the debris field distributions of some of the initiating components. The number of debris pieces shown is exaggerated in these images to convey the distribution pattern. Blast model inputs also only consider components that can physically break. The MCC and tanks are the only pressurized components in this model. The tanks are highly pressurized and have a much lower overpressure threshold than the MCC and turbopumps.
Test Case Results
Three test case scenarios were considered: source failures from the MCC, FTP, and OTP. Only one engine was tested since geometric symmetry would yield similar results for the other engines. Each test case simulation was run 1,000, 10,000, and 100,000 times at a 100-kilometer altitude. Using a C++ platform, the total runtime for 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations was around 4 minutes for each test case. Probabilities of resulting debris strikes for every case were intuitive; components closer to the initiating failure source were struck more often than those further away. Additionally, strike probabilities from the FTP initiator were higher overall, which is also intuitive considering it is closer in proximity to surrounding components than the MCC or OTP.
Specific types of failures that characterize end states are of interest when considering LOM and LOC. These include no additional failures, additional engine out only failures (pipes and critical high-energy components affected, but no tank bursts), and any tank bursts (which can lead to catastrophic stage explosions). Figure 6 summarizes these end-state failure frequencies for each initiator after simulating 100,000 Monte Carlo runs.
Figure 6 -End-State Probabilities (Additional Failures)
The end-state probabilities converge quickly with Monte Carlo realizations, but the number of unique propagation paths-the specific chain of components leading from the initiator to the last struck component-continues to grow. In each case, about 70% of the individual propagation paths resulted in a unique, single-occurrence sequence of events (i.e., had a probability of 1E-5). Figure 7 summarizes the endstate probabilities and number of individual paths generated from each simulation, along with engine out only (LOM) and tank burst (LOC) end states. Multiple propagation paths occur simultaneously for any given realization (event) and, although the number of paths increases, the LOM and LOC probabilities converge quickly.
Figure 7 -End-State Frequencies with Increased Trials: LOM (Dashed) and LOC (Solid)
Results show that many of the destructive end-state failures are due to failure propagation from other engines, rather than directly from the initiating engine. Leading to Tank Bursts Figure 9 shows the contributions of propagation events leading to a tank burst in a given realization. The graph shows that the number of propagations before the first tank burst ranges from 1 to 11 events, with 1 event representing a direct tank strike from the initiator. In order to capture at least 95% of the total failure contributions, it is necessary to track at least five propagation events. Coupling this with the large number of unique scenarios illustrates the need for a simulation-based approach for this type of problem.
Figure 9 -Contribution of Propagation Events for First Tank Burst
The unpredictability of these self-evolving scenarios shows how pre-defining a list of propagation paths can miss a significant amount of the potential risk. Many of the critical LOM and LOC outcomes do not manifest from a direct strike by the initiator, but rather through a series of complicated chain reactions that would be difficult to enumerate by intuition alone. This fact validates the use of the described modeling approach, which can possibly be instrumental in assessing and mitigating risks to crew systems during a launch vehicle abort.
CURRE T A D FUTURE WORK
Current work in progress includes establishing an energy failure criterion to create a more realistic representation of the liquid rocket engine bay scenario. In addition, failure propagation with varying altitudes will be simulated to observe blast wave propagation effects on propagation sequence paths.
Future work also includes incorporating additional model physics (such as debris size, aerodynamics, and ricochet models) and adding increased model complexity to include feed lines, avionics boxes, and other components of interest for a launch vehicle engine bay scenario. The ultimate goal is to determine the optimal placement of an abort warning device based on observed recurring propagation sequence paths. 
